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The Return of Mythic Voice in the 
Aporias of Narcissism 
Pleshette DeArmitt’s Ethical Idea  
Sara Beardsworth 
Southern Illinois University  
The ordeal of mourning, being so much harder than any thought its 
experience may deliver, bears out the impression developed in Julia 
Kristeva’s opening to The Severed Head—that thought is swift.1 She has 
recognized as well as anyone the interplay of blindness and insight. Nothing 
brings all this into starker evidence than the premature death of a loved 
other, a friend, or a true assistant in life and thought. There is a reminder in 
this that the new narratives of subjectivity on which Kristeva places a high 
value, and certainly the long life of meaning in the world, come at the price 
of the loss and mourning of our loved others. Pleshette DeArmitt’s book, The 
Right to Narcissism: A Case for an Im-possible Self-Love, has given the condition 
of narcissism an intricate place in this difficult if promising work. I have 
taken the case for an “im-possible self-love” to mean an ethical idea that 
grows in the movement of the aporias of narcissism found in the Western 
tradition—a movement prompted not least by what I will call the return of 
mythic voice.  I use the term “aporetic motility” here to capture the double 
sense of aporia as both “no exit from this condition”—no escape from 
narcissism—and the plasticity that comes from complicating its place in 
traditional oppositions. The idea of mythic voice joins three senses of return 
present in The Right to Narcissism:  first, the return to the scene of narcissism, 
one psychoanalytic and the other deconstructive; second, the return of 
mythic figures in Kristeva’s and Derrida’s rehabilitations of narcissism; 
third, the experience of return in mythic voice at the center of these 
rehabilitations. 
In placing readings of Kristeva and Derrida together, DeArmitt’s book 
offers not “One Narcissus” but a plurality of big and little narcissisms, new 
and old Narcissi, turning away from any mere agon of suffering subjectivity 
to the aporias of narcissism whose movement ultimately draws out the 
ethical idea. To capture this movement, we must consider three features of 
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the book. First, Kristeva introduces narcissism as a dynamic—not a moral—
value. Her Narcissus arises in a dynamic ternary structure that lays the 
foundations of psychic space, lies at the heart of the experience of love, and 
is essential to the creativity of the Kristevan imaginary. Second, Derrida 
introduces an ethical value in a versatile law of singularity that opens the 
passage to the other and institutes what might be called the “self” of 
deconstruction. In bringing the law of singularity that emerges in Derrida’s 
narratives of narcissism together with the rebirth of Narcissus in Kristeva’s 
work, DeArmitt underlines the need of new Narcissi, proposing an ethics of 
narcissism whose value in life is reflected into thought, and whose 
development in thought returns to life. On the one hand, this means the 
subject taking shape (again) and truly living in relations with others. On the 
other hand, it indicates the responsibility for producing new narratives of 
subjectivity.  Even here, however, the ethical idea does not appear fully. Its 
full appearance comes only in a third feature of the book: the reconnection, 
in both Kristeva and Derrida, of the mythic figure of Narcissus with that of 
Echo. I would like to propose, here, that it is the experience of return in 
mythic voice that constitutes and animates the self-relation that DeArmitt 
calls narcissism, making it both an opening of the passage to the other and 
the seed of the experience of love, each enhancing and enhanced by the 
capacity for narration. Above all, DeArmitt’s attention to the return of 
mythic voice has left us with the opportunity to develop the plurality of the 
return “in” mythic voice, as one way of maintaining the open horizon of 
both psychoanalysis and deconstruction. 
The Rebirth of Narcissus in the Sounds of the Other 
Following DeArmitt, we find that narcissism as a moral value appears 
in the opposition of self-love to love of other found in Western thought’s 
“naïve denunciations” of narcissism. Most conceptions posit either a 
monadic or a fusional dyadic state.2 Freud’s version specifies alternative 
paths for subjectivity in love: either self-love or idealization of the other, 
corresponding to his narcissistic and anaclitic/attachment types of object-
choice. Projecting the ideal image on to the other is the “true” object-choice, 
yet it is also the tendency of sexual overvaluation of the object,3 conflating 
what is error and what is true in love. That is to say, an aporia is already 
present in Freud. DeArmitt shows Kristeva developing that aporetic 
moment by bringing narcissism and idealization together, so that the logic of 
error versus truth gives way to the logic of narcissistic seeming.4  
She finds the major features of narcissistic seeming in Kristeva’s Tales of 
Love, where the very possibility of love lies in the idealization of a “third 
party”: a loving identification that is prior to or underlies the establishment 
of subject and object “positions” and relations. Its dynamic features, 
articulated in the psychoanalytic view on infantile life, are the elements of 
the cultivation of psychic space and are repeated in the experience of love.   
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The idealization that Kristeva calls archaic is a precocious loving 
identification: a transference of the emergent subject—the “not-yet-I”—to a 
third party whose advent forms Narcissus and his ideal self-image. In 
contrast to the traditional conception of the emergence of the narcissistic 
self-relation, which ties Narcissus to his specular or mirror image, Kristeva 
recovers his formation as an experience of not only vision but voice: the 
words of an other. As DeArmitt underlines, the archaic third is not grasped 
as a real person, however. The third is grasped, rather, like a sort of 
symbolic instance, “something that is here that cannot be here.”5 That is to say, 
the advent of the ideal Other situates the emergent Narcissus in a register of 
being other than what can be here as, say, external reality in Freud or the 
more stable significations of the symbolic realm. The logic of narcissistic 
seeming unfolds what we might call “illusory” being, whose movement not 
only lays the foundations of psychic space as the space of imagination but 
also shapes vital elements of the experience of love. 
In emphasizing that the third party is irreducible to any empirical entity 
and, above all, without any fixed features, DeArmitt allows us to hear, not 
vagueness in Kristeva’s expression for the third as “some sort of archaic 
occurrence of the symbolic,” but, rather, the flexibility and variability of its 
advent.6 This dawning of a ternary structure in Kristeva’s presentation of the 
little Narcissus is dependent on maternal desire and brings the relation to an 
indeterminable “not I” into infantile experience.  That is to say, the child 
receives the relation to a third that is offered (or refused) by the mother as a 
gift, allowing for a preliminary separation from maternal entity.7 The 
mother’s gift prompts an “immediate” transference to the third party: in 
mimicking the relation to a third, the child does not have to elaborate a 
relation to the loving third party. The psychical act of loving identification is 
therefore also to be understood through the passive tense, as a displacement 
of the emergent subject “to the very place from which he is seen and heard.”8 
With DeArmitt, “in chewing on and swallowing these sounds, the infant 
becomes bound to the third in love.”9 Archaic idealization receives and 
repeats the sounds of the Other in an oral assimilation, incorporating the 
other as rhythmic words.10 This is where Kristeva reveals the possibility of 
love arising in unity with the earliest capacities for representation. The 
shaping of psychic space begins with representations in the “imaginary” 
register or, put simply, pre-verbal representations whose minimal elements 
lie in the “primordial echoing” of the sounds of the Other. 
DeArmitt takes us from this notion of primordial echoing to Kristeva’s 
doubling of Narcissus in Echo: she who “nourishes herself on the words of 
the Other.”11 Echo’s reception and repetition of words form Narcissus in and 
through his “listening” to the echolalia that are his only “object.” Narcissus 
as Echo, then, presents a return “to” the self who is first “there” in return 
from the place of the Other, where she is seen and/or heard in these 
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“infinite echoes of the other’s words.”12 Archaic identification is a “being for 
and by the Other,” even as the Other, adds DeArmitt, for it is in taking 
himself for the third that the emergent subject comes to be situated “within 
the hysterical universe of loving idealization.”13 In other words, a little self-
deception makes existing for the Other existing for “myself.” In self-love “I” 
is like Other.  
DeArmitt therefore emphasizes the dynamic organization that appears 
in Kristeva’s account of the emergent subject. Narcissism is neither monadic 
nor fusional as such, but, rather, a complex and malleable structure.14  The 
accent falls especially on the nature of the rebound at the heart of 
transference to the third party, taking oneself for it. It is, above all, an 
experience of voice. Loving identification is carried out in sonorous 
rebounds between mouth and ear. The space of imagination therefore 
corresponds, for Kristeva, to “the entire gamut of perceptions, especially 
sonorous ones.”15 Following DeArmitt, the site where Narcissus and his Ego 
Ideal are born is not opposed to being but is being. Narcissistic seeming—
becoming like the Other in loving identification and transference—forms 
self-identity as singular, one, a producer of representations.16 Above all, this 
self-relation through doubling—Narcissus as Echo, Narcissus and his Ego 
Ideal—is upheld by the third party whose living core is the sonorous 
rebounds: what I will call the return in the sounds of the Other.  
If DeArmitt found a prescriptive in all this for new Narcissi as the 
complex organization in and through which the subject takes shape and 
truly lives, Narcissus is reborn, especially, in the experience of love. In 
projecting the ideal image on to an other, the subject repeats the transference 
and loving identification in the field of “positions” and relations of subject 
and object (other).17 To Kristeva, love therefore flourishes “between the two 
borders of narcissism and idealization.”18 Maintaining the tension between 
self-love and love of other is necessary to the experience of love. That is to 
say, although DeArmitt does not put it this way, the borders of narcissism 
and idealization also form the Scylla and Charybdis of the love experience, 
where to avoid one is to pass too close to the other, risking the whirlpool of 
the watery image or shipwreck on the shoals of idealization. These risks, the 
ones recognized by Freud, remain the internal limits of a projection in love 
whose essential rebound reveals “an exorbitant aggrandizement of the 
loving Self as extravagant in its pride as in its humility.”19 Unfolding this 
dynamic ternary structure, which is, again, prior to the separation of subject 
and object and then repeated in love, leads to Kristeva’s stress on the rebirth 
of Narcissus. Here DeArmitt finds a prescriptive aspect, striking the first 
ethical note in her book. There must be new Narcissi, taking shape and truly 
living in love as in the space of imagination. Therefore “it is essential that 
one read Kristeva’s texts on narcissism… as prescriptive for new narratives 
of ‘subjectivity.’”20 We observe, then, that in relation to the Western tradition 
these new narratives will mobilize the aporias of narcissism. 
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DeArmitt herself introduced the notion of aporia in turning to two 
narratives of narcissism in Derrida, first citing his assertion that 
deconstruction has always been concerned with the aporetic notion of 
narcissism, and then suggesting that this remains its explicit theme: “the 
aporias of narcissism are integral to the movement of ‘deconstruction’ and 
thus are made ‘explicit’ in each Derridean text.”21 Aporetic motility is in the 
foreground, then, where DeArmitt turns to these texts. Derrida does not find 
the aporia of narcissism directly within the traditional opposition of self-love 
and love of other, however. He draws the aporia out from the 
psychoanalytic texts on mourning. This difference is one feature of the 
unresolved tension between the rehabilitation of narcissism in Kristeva and 
that in Derrida. No attempt is made to have the readings simply overlap.  
Nonetheless, their juxtaposition in The Right to Narcissism does suggest 
an affinity between the respective narratives.  Derrida’s first narrative of 
narcissism begins with psychoanalysis. Thus both Kristeva and Derrida find 
their productive aporia for the notion of self-relation in psychoanalysis, and 
both find it just where it is narcissism that is in question there. What is more, 
in Derrida’s second narrative of narcissism, as in the Kristevan one, the 
return to the scene of narcissism is a recovery of not one mythic figure but at 
least two. It is, I venture, as though psychoanalysis were our mythology, and 
discovering aporetic motility in its themes of narcissism could release certain 
restrictions on this mythology. For we are not looking back to a “mythic 
world,” nor recapitulating the “founding myth” of psychoanalysis, nor 
giving notification (as Lacan did) that in Freud’s theory of the drives we find 
the very myths of psychoanalytic thought itself. Instead, bringing Kristeva’s 
and Derrida’s narratives of narcissism together has allowed psychoanalysis 
to appear as our mythology in the sense of a development of the logos of 
myth for us. This, I will suggest, is where the crux of the problematic lies.  
As each thinker draws out the aporias of narcissism in psychoanalysis, 
each develops a return of mythic voice that brings about the self-relation in 
DeArmitt’s sense: an opening of the passage to the other, the blossoming of 
the space of imagination, and the potentials of love. My objective is, not 
least, to show that the real depth of the affinity between Kristeva and 
Derrida in DeArmitt’s book lies, first, in their manifestation of the return in 
mythic voice that is the real key to the opening up of narcissism, and, 
second, in their shared knowledge of the role of love in this return. It is love 
that is responsible not only for the reverberation of the sounds of the Other 
at the heart of Kristeva’s rebirth of Narcissus but also for the resonance of 
words that institutes the relation to self in Derrida. In order to show this, we 
must first present the way in which deconstruction appears in DeArmitt’s 
book as the movement of the aporia of narcissism discovered within 
mourning.  
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From the Gaze of the Other to the Voice of the Other 
In an explicit relation to psychoanalysis, Derrida’s first narrative of 
narcissism develops an “other topology of mourning.” This “other 
topology” will exhibit the law of singularity that institutes the self in and 
through opening the passage to the other. In DeArmitt’s book it is vital to 
discern that the law of singularity overreaches the paternal law that is found 
so problematic in Freud and in the Western tradition in general. Despite the 
dexterity of her demonstration, I will find that the relation between the two 
laws is beset by an instability in the condition of bereavement.  With 
DeArmitt, Derrida’s new topology of mourning is of course of general 
significance in overcoming narcissistic foreclosure. The passage to the other 
that lies in mourning the other is not limited to the experience of 
bereavement that ushers it in. Nonetheless, this experience remains essential 
to his presentation of the new topology, so I find that the instability affecting 
the law of singularity in bereavement belongs as such to his first narrative of 
narcissism. We will find a remedy for this in DeArmitt’s presentation of his 
second narrative, just where Derrida comes to the resonance of mythic voice. 
DeArmitt tells us that the movement of deconstruction is a double 
gesture. Taking up certain of Derrida’s texts, she shows this movement 
going from the exposure of one narcissism as a symptom of Western thought 
to the elaboration of another narcissism that relieves the necessity of the 
first. In a remarkable avowal, she writes that narcissism for Derrida is 
initially nothing other than the law of the father.22 It is the narcissism, not of the 
child too close to the mother and in need of the name of the father to exit this 
condition (to attain to the life of spirit), but, rather, of the father who brings 
“assistance” to his son or text (his “son-text”) so that he may admire himself 
in his progeny. “The naïve rendering or common illusion [fantasme courant] 
is that you have given your name to X, thus all that returns to X, in a direct 
or indirect way, in a straight or oblique line, returns to you, as a profit for 
your narcissism.”23  
The second gesture comes in two guises.  The first begins with an aporia 
of narcissism that Derrida discovers in the image of the (mortal) other, just 
where psychoanalysis stipulated an opposition between failure and success 
in mourning. Incorporation, which appropriates and keeps the other in the 
self, corresponds to Freud’s conception of “pathological mourning” or 
melancholia. Abraham and Torok’s notion of incorporation develops the 
pathological conception. It reveals a living dead object that has been set up 
in the self. As DeArmitt explains, incorporation functions “both as a 
monument to loss and as a resistance to this loss.”24 The contrary notion, 
introjection, corresponds to normal mourning in Freud, where the desires 
and drives previously invested in an external object are drawn back to the 
ego, ending dependency on the object. In Derrida’s words, the drives and 
desires are “re-appropriated” in contrast to the appropriation of 
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incorporation, which keeps the other in the self as in “the tomb or the vault 
of some narcissism.”25 Introjection is itself an interiorization, one that is “a 
memorization.” In contrast to the failure of melancholia, “success” in 
mourning would lie not only in freeing the drives and desires from the 
object but also in safekeeping the other in memory.26 However, this is just 
where Derrida finds the aporia of narcissism, for introjection is both absolute 
fidelity to the other and the utter betrayal of their alterity in and through the 
safekeeping of their image “in me.”27 The aporia of narcissism belongs to the 
very process of interiorization-idealization that sets up the image of the 
departed other “in me” in mourning. 
What comes to move the aporia in Derrida is the inversion of the 
schema of visibility in the image of the other, for this alters the spatial 
relations of what is interiority and what is outside. That is to say, the ordeal 
of mourning brings the gaze of the mortal other to bear “on me,” frustrating 
and wounding the interiority that would close the other within itself. The 
gaze of the (mortal) other “in me, outside me” instructs and institutes the 
self. Thus “before the other” is “before the law.”28 Once again, as DeArmitt 
stresses, this “mourning effect” does not wait for death but is, in Derrida, the 
general form of the inscription of the other in me. Nonetheless, we have seen 
it come to the fore in the movement of the aporia of narcissism discovered in 
the theme of mourning in psychoanalysis. The movement of memory, 
coming from and returning to the mortal other, “instructs and institutes” the 
self. Derrida’s law of singularity therefore turns up first in this “other 
topology of mourning” that displaces those psychoanalytic topologies that 
have configured the ambiguities of paternal law since Freud. Paternal law, 
for Freud, appeared not only as the civilizing function in the constitution of 
the “subject” but also as the unconscious persecuting judgment, especially 
active in melancholia. Derrida’s “other topology of mourning” therefore 
seems to offset the centrality of paternal law in Freud. It not only avoids the 
persecuting judgment but also deflects the narcissistic return of the “father” 
in and through the aporetic motility of unavoidable narcissism in mourning. 
The movement of the aporia brings forth the law of singularity.  
It strikes me, nonetheless, that in bereavement the two laws remain in 
an unstable relation to one another owing to the difficult properties of the 
gaze. For some “accident” of psychic life—and there are many—may lead 
Derrida’s topology of mourning to undergo a reversal into the one known 
from Freud when he found the aggressive drive operating, across the 
unconscious-conscious gap of repression, between the superego and the ego. 
In bereavement certain accidents of psychic life, whether those of the living 
or those of the dead, may be reinforced by the ordeal of mortal loss and by 
the very process of interiorization-idealization itself, perhaps leading to 
repression. The memory coming from the other may slip away and the 
dynamics of the gaze revert to that superegoic relation in Freud. That is to 
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say, the bereaved falls under a judgment. For who, stunned by the sudden 
mortal departure of the loved other, will really hold off the encroaching 
sense that somehow one has failed them? Thus, in Derrida’s first narrative of 
narcissism, which DeArmitt has called “the eye of Narcissus,” the themes of 
psychoanalysis present in the first gesture of deconstruction may return to 
encroach on the second. In sum, a certain instability affects this narrative 
insofar as the second gesture takes the guise of the interiorization of the gaze 
of the other, which is now intimate and proximate 
In our view, DeArmitt’s presentation of Derrida’s second narrative of 
narcissism—“the ear of Echo”—will respond to this instability. Here the 
second gesture supplements the interiorization of the gaze of the other with 
the interiorization of the voice of the other. The voice of the other appears in 
Derrida’s return to the scene of Ovid’s myth. The two mythic figures are not 
now in a relation of doubling, as in Kristeva, but are set apart and differently 
confined in respect of the address from one to an other (which is absent from 
doubling). Echo, deprived of spontaneity under a divine interdiction, cannot 
initiate the call to the other. Narcissus cannot “let himself go,” but only issue 
the call aimed at a profit for his narcissism. An analogy now suggests itself. 
Under the sovereign injunction, Echo may neither speak first, nor remain 
silent, nor reply in her own words, but only repeat the final words or 
syllables of another’s speech, according to a law she cannot address herself 
to—not unlike the bereaved suffering uneasily from a judgment that the 
living cannot quite get a hold of. Freud elaborated this seemingly 
inescapable sense of judgment—for it lacks all position—in terms of the 
deferred authority of the “dead father.” Derrida, too, noted the persecutor in 
Freudian melancholy.29 Altering the Freudian topology is a long cultural, 
philosophical, personal road between memory and forgetting. But there can 
be many a slip in the process of interiorization-idealization that sets up the 
image of the departed other “in me,” as Derrida seems to be aware. This 
adds interest to DeArmitt’s demonstration that his reading of Echo reworks 
the structures of self-relation in terms of the experience of voice. His 
presentation of the experience of voice equally maintains the tension with 
Kristeva’s thought, even though psychoanalysis plays no particular role in 
“the ear of Echo.”  
Surprisingly, in relation to Narcissus, Echo manifests no sense of 
judgment under the divine interdiction. Of course Derrida elaborates the 
“ruse” that circumvents the sovereign injunction in her answer to the 
narcissistic call to her to “come.” The “ruse” lies in the very return, in her 
own voice, of narcissistic words.  Echo “speaks in such a way that the words 
become her own,” for she mourns her own autonomy, “wholly affirming the 
precedence and alterity of the other.”30 The asymmetry in which his 
narcissistic words fall on her ear turns into the radical asymmetry of 
language in which his words are transcendent, wholly other in her ear. 
Through her reception and iteration of his words, she signs “in her own 
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name.”31 The key to this lies in the logic of (re-)appropriation. DeArmitt 
shows how it develops the narcissistic appropriation that Derrida has called 
the law of need or desire: the “it is necessary [il faut] that I want the thing to 
be mine” is at work in all experience; moreover, the “desire” alongside it 
that the other nonetheless “remain foreign, transcendent, other” lies in the 
interest one still has in making it one’s own.32 Echo cannot issue the gesture 
of narcissistic appropriation. In mourning her own autonomy, another logic 
takes over in a manner that underlines the important failure of mourning “to 
subjectivize the other in me.” 33 We recall that this failure prevents the aporia 
that undermines the supposed success in mourning (introjection) from being 
a dead-end. The failure is the way forward. In Derrida’s topology of 
mourning the constitutive failure of subjectivization is called an “ex-
appropriation,” an appropriation that begins from the other.  
With DeArmitt, ex-appropriation is a double movement: “both an 
inescapable gesture of (re-)appropriation and the necessary failure to 
interiorize that which remains outside, over there, always out of reach.”34 
The resistance to subjectivization is revitalized and sustained in the “the 
complex relationship” between iteration and ex-appropriation that Derrida 
articulates in the return to Ovid’s myth.35 With Echo, the return of words 
from the other to the other “prevents the self… from entirely closing the 
other within the self.”36 The return in Echo’s voice of the beckoning call that 
was made by Narcissus to her brings Narcissus himself to the law of 
singularity—for she “speaks the other and makes the other speak.”37 In 
Ovid’s myth Narcissus “looks around and shouts ‘Come! Come!’”38 To 
Derrida, Echo’s initiative or inventiveness would therefore consist only “in 
opening, in uncloseting, destabilizing foreclusionary structures, so as to 
allow for the passage to the other.”39  
But the cleverness of Echo’s ex-appropriation is not all. To Derrida, she 
lovingly and lucidly “take[s] back the initiative of answering or responding 
in a responsible way.”40 For DeArmitt, her answer signs “her own love.”41 
The iteration-ex-appropriation takes form and gains its force from a loving 
affirmation that exceeds his narcissistic call, infusing and giving narcissistic 
words new life.42 I see this as the prevailing ethical moment in DeArmitt’s 
presentation of Derrida’s return to the scene of narcissism. It does not bring 
Narcissus back to judgment. Rather, the loving affirmation seems to 
strengthen the law of singularity in the very form it has taken in Derrida’s 
topology of mourning: “I must and I must not take the other into myself.”43  
This is the point at which my emphasis diverges somewhat from the 
one made explicit in DeArmitt’s text. She points to the analogy, in giving 
birth to singularity, between “the introjection of the other’s gaze (as in the 
case of Narcissus) and the interiorization of the other’s voice (as in the case 
of Echo).”44 Nonetheless, I suggest, the loving affirmation reveals another 
significance of Echo’s “ruse,” for it resists the process of interiorization-
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idealization on account of which the law of singularity arises in the intimate, 
proximate gaze of the (mortal) other.45 I have suggested that this process 
carries the risk of a covert recurrence of paternal law, as though not all of the 
latencies of this law were yet played out. That is to say, in the process of 
interiorization-idealization, the image of the other it sets up “in me” is 
susceptible to merging with the ego ideal. Freud identified the latter’s 
potential for contamination by a tyranny of the superego when he 
discovered that excessively juridical fate of the prohibitional form of the 
“other” in me in a kind of paroxysm of conscience: the judgment laden with 
aggressive drives exercised by the superego over the ego. In sum, what I am 
indicating is that the gaze of the other in mourning may return to the 
bereaved with the force of judgment, the force of law. Thus the importance of 
resistance in Echo’s “ruse.” If the voice of the other can strengthen the 
double bind of ex-appropriation—“I must and I must not take the other into 
myself”—it can equally hold off the risk that memory, coming from and 
returning to the other, may give way in bereavement to the unconscious 
paternal imago of which one experiences only the deadly judgment.  
We are noting, then, that rehabilitations of narcissism that render 
Narcissus as an experience of not only vision but voice can develop the 
philosophical meaning of the gaze, yet, at the same time, the manifestation 
of the voice of the other resists the difficult properties of the gaze. This 
lessens the risk of return of the “force” of paternal law. Removing the subject 
from the implied narcissism of paternal law (the “father’s assistance”), and 
from the law’s activity as unconscious imago, is not only possible but can 
endure. That is to say, the return in Echo’s voice resists either falling back on 
narcissistic words or falling back under the unassimilable judgment. Thus, 
here, the return in mythic voice distances the “self” from the miserable fate 
of Freud’s Oedipus (subject to the persecutor), from the “big narcissism” 
that appears, in Derrida, to overtake Freud’s oedipal dialectic, and from the 
negative view of narcissism. For, according to DeArmitt, Derrida’s Echo is a 
“little narcissist.”46 
The Return of Love in Mythic Voice 
Narcissus as Echo in Kristeva. Echo and Narcissus in Derrida. One takes 
the watery image shimmering over the void into “the whole contrivance of 
imagery, representations, identifications, and projections” that fulfills 
narcissistic seeming and furnishes the space of imagination.47 As for the 
other, with Derrida, “one knows that the relation to oneself, that Narcissus 
himself… precedes himself, answering only for himself, only from the 
resonance of Echo.”48 Moreover, both the sonorous rebounds of the words of 
the other (Kristeva) and their resonance (Derrida) have revealed themselves 
as a return in mythic voice. This brings us, finally, to the question of 
psychoanalysis and mythology that is present in a somewhat submerged 
way in DeArmitt’s book. For she cites Lacoue-Labarthe posing this question, 
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and doing so precisely in posing Narcissus and Echo as a question: “to refer 
to our mythology—I mean psychoanalysis—I would like to know (if this can 
be known) what happens when one goes back from Narcissus to Echo.”49  
We have seen, with Derrida, that a return to Ovid’s Echo manifests the 
resonance of words that constitutes the self-relation in opening the passage 
to the other. We would add something further. Once DeArmitt brings 
Derrida’s rehabilitation of narcissism together with Kristeva’s, each mythic 
figure that returns to us in psychoanalysis presents a palimpsest. That is to 
say, a big narcissism shows the traces of a little narcissist. There is Kristeva’s 
little Narcissus “after” Oedipus, and Derrida’s Echo “after” Narcissus. Echo, 
too—I suggest—may present a palimpsest. Following Lacoue-Labarthe, we 
may ask what happens when we “go back” from the return in her voice to 
another return in mythic voice: briefly, to another moment in Kristeva, once 
she takes up the work of Melanie Klein.50   
We find Kristeva returning to another scene of narcissism when she 
considers the significance of this analyst’s renowned treatment of an 
unspeaking child, whom we are told is largely devoid of affects, and whom 
one might today call autistic. Klein tells us that the child calls out to no one. 
We note, then, that here the resonance of words and, equally, the rhythm of 
sonorous rebounds are absent because neither the narcissistic call nor the 
mother’s gift is made. In accompanying the child in play to the frightening 
void and the “nameless dreads” that bar his psychic representations of 
mother and father, the analyst drew the precocious call to the other out of 
silence. What is important for us is Kristeva’s underlining of the mythical 
way in which Klein approached the unconscious (in speaking of trains—the 
big train “Daddy” and the little train “Dick”).  This is not to set store by a 
simple circularity, going from Oedipus to Narcissus, from Narcissus to Echo, 
and then “back” from Echo to the classical Oedipus. For here, too, is a return 
in mythic voice. Kristeva writes that Klein gives the unconscious “a sort of 
name—in a mythical way.”51 The return in mythic voice is affective 
resonance this time: a resonance with nameless dreads and with an 
unspoken and unspeakable appeal. Affective resonance leads to the 
expression of inhibited affects and draws out the call to the other; it enables 
the rise of trust and a child’s transition into the metonymic world of play. 
But of course that is another story.  
Whether it is Echo’s “ruse” or the sounds of the Other or an analyst’s 
thoughtful kindness to a child—and be it viewed as verbal resonance 
and/or sonorous (rhythmic) reverberations and/or affective resonance, 
almost tactile—what is paramount is the loving affirmation. DeArmitt 
reminds us that, with Kristeva, one speaks of love only after the fact. The 
time of love is the “nontime” that is “both instant and eternity.”52 Her 
readings of the Kristevan and Derridean rehabilitations of narcissism do not, 
then, simply send us back to psychoanalysis or deconstruction as the subject 
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of the movement of the aporias of narcissism in the Western tradition. Nor 
do they settle us in relation to one mythic figure as the substance of that 
movement. Rather, they tilt the subject toward taking shape and truly living 
from time to time, in the return—more than “one”—of mythic voice.  All the 
while knowing them for their gift of illusory being.  
All of this means that each rehabilitation of narcissism provides notice 
of its internal limits. In Kristeva we have found the Scylla and Charybdis 
lying within love and self-identity. For Derrida, it is “death in the end, 
which is the limit.”53 The limit of the living and loving voice that is “in me” 
but just as much over there, out of reach. Death changes everything. Thus, if 
the return or resonance in mythic voice may resist the unassimilable 
judgment that one has failed the (mortal) other, this resistance is a support 
for, and not the evasion of, that part of the ethics of narcissism left to us in 
their premature departure. We may receive the inexhaustible memory that 
comes from and returns to our never-old Narcissi . . . 
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